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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the dissent's interpretation of Gruner 26 that the judgment lienor
would have priority only if its lien had been perfected first. They
also restricted the application of the majority's "general rule" to
pledges of future crops 27 and mortgages of after-acquired property.28
That rule would not apply here where there is an assignment of a
future fund which is to arise out of a present property right, and
which was originally advanced by the assignee. However valid this
may appear,2 9 the law now seems to be that an assignment of after-
acquired property is inferior to a subsequent judgment creditor's lien.
This is true even if the property had come into existence before the
creditor's lien was obtained.30
Absent successful legislative action,3 ' we may expect a decrease
in the use of such assignments of future property as security, since
such assignees will never be "secured" unless they enter into litiga-
tion. One wonders if justice, and business, would not be better served
by giving priority to the first perfected claim.32
MOTION PICTURE CENSORSHIP-LICENSE DENIAL ON GROUNDS
OF INDECENcY-HELD INVALID. -The New York State Board of
Regents unanimously denied a license ' to exhibit the film Garden of
26 See Matter of Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1947); Matter of
Gruner, 4 M.2d 471, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
27 Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894).
28 Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907).
29 It is to be noted that the reason for the "general rule" (see note 11 supra)
actually does not apply. Only the proceeds of the assignee's extension of credit
are governed by the assignment. Hence the proceeds of the property furnished
6y subsequent creditors do not go to the assignee.
As to the correct interpretation of Matter of Gruner, it is important to
note that the state made no claim for taxes due for 1942 since it had not filed
a claim for them until after the perfection of the assignee's lien. Matter of
Gruner, 4 M.2d 471, 473, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (Surr. Ct. 1947). Also, Chief
Judge Conway, who concurred with the dissent in the instant case, wrote the
majority opinion in the Gruner case.
30 City of New York v. Bedford Bar and Grill, 2 N.Y.2d 429, 141 N.E.2d
575 (1957).
31 In 1953, 1954 and 1955, the legislature introduced bills to give priority to
bank-assignees. While both houses passed the bills in 1954 and 1955, the gov-
ernor vetoed them without memoranda. See City of New York v. Bedford
Bar and Grill, supra note 30, at 434, 141 N.E.2d at 577. This could be construed
to mean that the legislature attempted to either nullify the lower court decisions
in this area, or to change the existing law as expressed by the majority in the
instant case.
32 See Matter of Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1947); Matter of
Gruner, 4 M.2d 471, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
1 N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 122, which provides that the Regents may refuse a
license to exhibit if it finds the motion picture to be ". . . obscene, indecent,
immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition
would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime. ... "
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Eden on the grounds that it was "indecent." The film deoicts, in
color, life in a nudist camp wherein both sexes appear nude together,
although their private parts are not shown-to the viewing audience.
The Appellate Division, in an Article 78 proceeding brought by the
exhibitor, reversed the Board's determination. The Court of Appeals
held that indecency cannot be the basis for movie censorship unless
it is construed to mean obscene 2 and that this picture was not obscene
as a matter of law.3 Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 3 N.Y.2d
237, 144 N.E.2d 31 (1957), reargument denied, - N.Y.2d -
(1957).
It is admitted that freedom of speech is not absolute.4  That
certain types of expression, particularly obscenity, can be punished
by law is universally accepted 5 and is the rule today as evidenced
by obscenity statutes in every state in the union.6 However, it has
2 The majority opinion stated that "indecency" has always been construed,
in New York, to mean "obscenity." Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
3 N.Y.2d 237, 243, 144 N.E.2d 31, 35 (1957). This construction is based on
the maxim "noscitur a sociis". It should be noted that the Court of Appeals
previously attempted to do this with the term "immoral" but the Supreme Court
nevertheless reversed the decision. Superior Films Inc. v. Department of Educ.,
346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam).
The Court distinguished the traditional definition of obscenity as stated
in Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). The Hicklin test was that
the tendency of the matter, charged as obscenity, is to deprave and corrupt
those whose minds are open to such influences and who may come into contact
with the matter. The traditional test is based on the matter's influence on the
average person.
4 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
G See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925);
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Commonwealth v. Blanding,
20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825).
6ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 373 (1940); AaRz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-532
(1956); A . STAT. §§41-2702 to -2704 (1956); CAL. Px. CODE ANN. §311(West 1955); COLO. Rmv. STAT. ANN. §§40-9-16 to -19 (1953); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 8567 (1949) ; DE. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 711 (1953) ; D.C. CODE ANN.§ 22-2001 (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 847.01, 847.06 (Supp. 1956); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 26-6301 to -6305 (Supp. 1956) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-4101 to -4102(1947) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, §§ 468-71 (Smith-Hurd 1956) ; IND. ANN. STAT.§§ 10-2803 to -2805 (Burns Supp. 1957); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 725.3 to .11(1950) ; KCAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-112, 21-1101 to -1106 (1949) ; Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §436.100 (Baldwin 1955); LA. Rv. STAT. tit. 14, § 106 (Supp.
1956); Mr. R-v. STAT. ANN. c. 134, §§24-29 (Supp. 1957); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, §§ 514-16 (Supp. 1957); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 272, §§28-32 (Supp.
1956); MicH. Corn'. LAws .§§750.142-43, 750.343-46 (1948); MiNN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 617.24 to .26 (1945), 5 MINN. Ss. LAW SEnv. c. 323 (1957) ; Miss.
CoDE ANN. §§2286-89 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§563.270 to 290, 563.310(Vernon 1949); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 94-3601 to -3603 (Supp. 1957);
Nan. Rxv. STAT. §§28-921 to -926 (1956); Nxv. RFv. STAT. §201.250; N.H.
Rlv. STAT. ANN. §§ 571:14 to :19 (1955) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A :115-1 to -4(Supp. 1956); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-21-2, 14-21-12 (1953); N.Y. Pa. LAW§§ 114043 (Supp. 1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-189 to -194 (Supp. 1955);
N.D. REv. CODE §§ 12-2107 to -2110, 40-0501(62) (1943); Onio Ray. CODE
1957]
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been consistently maintained by many that any form of previous
restraint 7 amounting to censorship of speech or press is unconstitu-
tional.8  But it was not until 1952, with the decision in Burstvn v.
Wilson,9 that censorship of motion pictures raised a constitutional
question since before this time they were not considered Part of the
press or an organ of public opinion. 10
It is now recognized that the protection of the first and four-
teenth amendments ". . . even as to previous restraint is not abso-
lutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in
exceptional cases. .. ." 11 The majority opinion in the instant case
maintains that obscenity is such an exceptional case. 12  Judge
Desmond, in his opinion, relied in part on the decision in Roth v.
United States 13 in which Justice Brennan stated: "We hold that ob-
ANN. §§ 2905.34 to .37 (Baldwin 1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1021(Supp. Aug. 1957); Om REV. STAT. §§ 167.150, 167.152 (1955); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3831-33, 4524 (Purdon Supp. 1956); R.I. GEN. LAws c. 610,§§ 13-15 (1938) ; S.C. CODE §§ 16-414 to -415 (1952) ; S.D. CODE §§ 13.1722 to
.1723 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-3001 (Supp. 1957); TEx. PEN. CoDE
ANN. art. 526-27, 612 (Vernon Supp. 1956); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-39-1 to
-39-4 (1953) ; VT. STAT. §§ 8490-92 (1947) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-113 to -113.1(Supp. 1956); WAsH. REv. CODE §§9.68.010 to .020 (1952); W. VA. CODE
NN. §6066 (1955); Wis. STAT. §§944.21 to .22 (1955); Wyo. ComP. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9-513 to -514 (1945).
7 For the purpose of this article, previous restraint is defined as interference
with a publication or movie before it is published or produced and before it
reaches the market for sale or exhibition. The terms "censorship" and
"licensing" are used interchangeably and are defined as means of effecting
previous restraint.8 The main purpose of such constitutional provisions is "to prevent all such
previaus restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other govern-
ments... ." Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313 (1825),
quoted with approval in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
"Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are
education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the
rights of free speech and assembly. . . ." Whitney v. California. 274 U.S.
357, 378 (1927) (concurring opinion). Accord, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454 (1907); 4 BLACxSTONE, COMMENTARmS *151-52; 2 STORY, COm-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 600 (2d ed. 1851).9343 U.S. 495 (1952).
10 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
11 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). In Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951), the Court stated, "An analysis of the leading cases
in this Court which have involved direct limitations on speech, however, will
demonstrate that both the majority of the Court and the dissenters in particular
cases have recognized that this is not an unlimited, unqualified right, but that
the societal value of speech must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values
and consideration." And in Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952), the
Court, although refusing to make an exception to the rule against previous re-
straint in this particular case, stated: "It does not follow that the Constitution
requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all
times and all places."
12 Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 3 N.Y.2d 237, 241, 144 N.E.2d 31, 34
(1957).
13 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press." 14 Since the Roth case determined the constitutionality of
obscenity statutes, not of previous restraint statutes,15 it might be
argued that the above quoted phrase was in reference to punishment
for past abuses and that an application of the decision to censorshir
is beyond its scope.' 6 But it appears that the Roth case affirmed
that which the Court has long presumed; that obscenity is subject to
censorship. In Near v. Minnesota,'7 the Court in listing several ex-
ceptions to the general rule against previous restraints stated: "On
similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be en-
forced against obscene publications." 18 And in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire: 19 "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene.... 20
In fact there is substantial justification for the belief that the
Court does not even include the prohibition of obscenity within its
concept of previous restraint. It is the character of the right, not
the limitation, which determines where the individual's freedom ends
and the state's power begins.21 "Not every type of speech occupies
the same position on the scale of values. There is no substantial
public interest in permitting certain kinds of utterances: the lewd
and obscene. .. " 22 Even Justice Douglas, a relentless foe of all
types of previous restraint, stated that ". . . the freedom to sneak
is not absolute; the teaching of methods of terror and other seditious
14Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
15 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952); CA. PEN. CoDE ANN. § 311 (West 1955).
16 This argument receives support from further statements by Justice Brennan
in the Roth case. "... [W]e hold that these statutes . .. do not offend con-
stitutional safeguards against convictions based upon protected material or fail
to give men in acting adequate notice of what is prohibited" Roth v. UnitedStates, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957). And Justice Brennan's individual position on
censorship might well have been voiced in his dissenting opinion in Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), wherein he stated: "A statute
which does not afford the defendant, of right, a jury determination of obscenity
falls short, in my view, of giving proper effect to the standard fashioned as the
necessary safeguard demanded by the freedoms of speech and press for ma-
terial which is not obscene." Roth v. United States, supra at 448.
17 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
is Id. at 716.
19315 U.S. 568 (1942).
20 Id. at 571-72. In a concurring opinion in the Burstyn case, Justice Frank-
furter indicated that the problem is not so easy of solution that it can be de-
cided that motion pictures ". . . may be subjected to unrestricted censorship,
or that they must be allowed to be shown under any circumstances.... [O]nly
the tyranny of absolutes would rely on such alternatives to meet the problems
generated by the need to accommodate the diverse interests affected by the
motion pictures in compact modem communities." Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 517-18 (1952) (concurring opinion).21 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
22 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 544 (1951) (concurring opinion).
1957 ]
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conduct should be beyond the pale [of the first amendmentl along
with obscenity and immorality." 23  In several cases the Court has
declared a statute unconstitutional as an attempt to license or censor
the press, but in these cases it is strongly indicated that the same
statutes would not be licensing or censorship if they were limited to
restraining obscenity or other matter offensive to public morals.24
However, the fact that obscene publications are not protected
from previous restraint does not permit a state to establish a complete
and unbridled system of censorship.2 5 A licensing statute must be
clearly drawn and well-defined.2 6 For example, an Illinois obscenity
statute 27 was held constitutional in Beauharnais v. Illinois 2s because
it was ". . . not a catchall enactment . . ." but was "... specificallv
directed at a defined evil .... , 29
By a series of Supreme Court decisions,30 many of the grounds
for refusal of a license listed in Section 122 of the New York Edu-
cation Law 3 1 have been declared unconstitutional. The terms
"obscene" and "indecent" remain, but without any definition or ex-
23 1d. at 581 (dissenting opinion).
24 See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
25 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). "If there be capacity for evil
it may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control,
but it does not authorize substantially unbridled censorship such as we have
here ... ." Id. at 503.
26 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). "... [T]he
decisions of the court upholding statutes as sufficiently certain, rested upon the
conclusion that they employed words or phrases having a technical or other
special meaning, well enough known to enable those within their reach to cor-
rectly apply them .... " Id. at 391, quoted with approval in Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
27IL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, §471 (1934).
28 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
2 9 Id. at 253.30 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) ("tending to the corruption of
the morals of youth") ; Superior Films Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S.
587 (1954) (per curiam) ("harmful," "immoral" and "tend to corrupt morals") ;
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ("sacrilegious"); Gelling v. Texas,
343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam) ("prejudicial to the best interests of the
people of the city").3 1 In addition to New York, there are twelve states which have licensing
statutes. Since, for the most part, they are similar in substance to the New
York statute the Supreme Court decisions apply equally to all. The other
states are: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 521.01 to .04 (1943) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-6301a
to -6307a (1953) (excludes motion pictures) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-101
to -112 (1949) ; LA. REv. STAT. tit. 4, §§ 301-07 (1950) ; MD. ANN. Com art.
66A (Supp. 1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. §74.143(5) (Vernon 1949) (delegates
power of censorship to cities of the first class) ; Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 3305.01(Baldwin Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 41-58 (Purdon 1956); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 6-202(9), (11) (1956) (delegates licensing power to municipal-
ities) ; TEx. PEN. CODE art. 612 (Vernon 1952) and TEX. Rzv. Civ. STAT. art.
1175(22) (Vernon 1953) (delegating power of censorship to municipality, as
interpreted by Zydias Amusement Co. v. City of Houston, 185 S.W. 415 [Tex.
Civ. App. 19161); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 10-8-41 (1953) (delegates municipality
authority to suppress obscenity) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-98 to -116 (1950).
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planation 3 2 Judge Burke, in Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 33
maintained that "indecency" was clearly defined, for the purpose of
the instant case, by reference to Section 1140b of the Penal Law 34
which makes a misdemeanor any exposition by a person of his pri-
vate parts in the presence of two or more persons of the opposite
sex, whose private parts are similarly exposed. That a term in one
statute can satisfy the requirement of a "clearly drawn" statute by
reference to an entirely different statute is questionable. In any case.
the definition is insufficient as a full definition of "indecent," since,
as conceded by Judge Burke, it is applicable only to facts similar to
those of the instant case.33 Since licensing statutes will be subject to
close examination by the Supreme Court 36 some revision of the New
York statute seems necessary. It is unfortunate, therefore, that
Judge Desmond's opinion is not too helpful to the legislators who
will be faced with the task of defining and clarifying so nebulous an
area.
NEW YORK PRACTICE - EVIDENCE - TESTIMONY GIVEN AT
LUNACY INQUEST BY DEcEASED WITNESSES HELD ADMISSIBLE IN
PROBATE PROCEEDING.- Decedent was declared insane in 1930,
approximately nine months after executing a will. When she died in
1952, the will was denied probate on the basis of testimony given by
two witnesses at the lunacy proceeding. These two witnesses were
themselves deceased at the time of probate, but their prior testimony
was admitted under Section 348 of the New York Civil Practice Act.'
The Court of Appeals, by a divided court, held that the testimony
32 N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 122a (Supp. 1957) defines those terms previously held
unconstitutional (see note 31 supra), but gives no definition of "obscene!' or
"indecent."
33 3 N.Y2d 237, 253, 144 N.E2d 31, 41 (dissenting opinion).
34 N.Y. Pm. LAw § 1140b (1951).
8 5Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 3 N.Y.2d 237, 253, 144 N.E2d 31, 41
(1957) (dissenting opinion).36 "[A] ssuming that a state may establish a system for the licensing of mo-
tion pictures ... our duty requires us to examine the facts of the refusal of
a license in each case to determine whether the principles of the First Amend-
ment have been honored." Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952)
(concurring opinion). See also Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 244 F.2d 432
(7th Cir.), rezld, - U.S. - (Nov. 12, 1957).
1 The statute provides that ". . . the testimony of the decedent ... taken
or read in evidence at the former trial or hearing ... may be given or read in
evidence . . . upon any subsequent trial or hearing . . . of the same subject-
matter in the same or another action or special proceeding between the same
parties to such former trial or hearing, . . . by either party to such subsequent
action or special proceeding. . . ." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 348.
